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22 April 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible US Harassment Actions in Cambodia

1. The opportunities for effective harassment of VC/NVA forces in Cambodia are relatively limited. Their strong logistical base which undoubtedly includes substantial stockpiles of supplies -- possibly upwards of 2,000 tons of ordnance -- is so widely dispersed that it does not offer sound targets against which operations can be directed. Meaningful destruction of enemy supplies would in large measure be a result of chance.

2. The most promising harassments, in terms of finding a real deterrent to further Communist advances in Cambodia, would be those designed to locate and destroy their command and control facilities, particularly COSVN headquarters, or their human resources. The following suggestions of possible harassment actions are made on the premise that they might result in substantial enemy casualties:

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(1) Authorize all [] to conduct offensive operations and call in air and artillery strikes.

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| a. A relatively low-profile way of locating and attacking enemy troops. | a. Effects would be localized. |
| b. These would be immediate impact operations. | b. Some risks if teams need to be withdrawn. |

(2) Ground sweep in force through Base Area

353.

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| a. A successful sweep could eliminate all or some part of COSVN headquarters. | a. Area is probably heavily defended and high US casualties would undoubtedly result. |
| b. Significant stock-piles and facilities could be destroyed. | b. COSVN is somewhat a floating crap game, so location of headquarters would require prolonged and extensive sweep. |
| c. Could have significant shock-effect on VC/NVA high command. | |

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(3) Ground sweep in force into Base Area 702.

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
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| a. Would disrupt a major enemy logistics control center and sanctuary area. | a. Securing area would be difficult. |
| b. FARK is dug in to south and west --- facilitating coordination and hopefully blocking escape routes to west. | b. Enemy reinforcements could be moved in quickly. |
| c. Area believed to be lightly defended. | |
| d. Located in remote area with minimum risk of publicity. | |
| e. Could deny a potential base of operations for Sihanouk. | |

(4) Ground sweep in force into Base Area 704.

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| a. Could destroy or disrupt a major logistics apparatus serving IV Corps. | a. A deep penetration might be needed to effectively harass troops near Phnom Penh. |
| b. Could cause diversions of VC/NVA troops in areas west towards Phnom Penh. | b. Could be in large measure an ARVN ground operation with US air and artillery support. |
| c. Immediate effects which could be long lasting. | |


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(5) Target a multi-company




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reaction force, with TAC air, artillery and B-52
air against Base Area 353.

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
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| a. Lower profile than option (2). | a.  forces are mighty light and would be heavily pressed. |
| b. Possibility of same results as option (2) but with less exposure of ground troops. | b. Large enemy defensive forces. |
| c. Operation would be quicker than ground operation. | |

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(6) Send Khmer Serai Units into Cambodia.

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| a. Being ethnic Cambodians, they would present a low profile. | a. Their numbers are small. |
| b. They could conduct guerrilla operations to harass enemy operations. | |
| c. Low cost (to US) favorable response to Cambodian requests for aid. | |

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